Dual Use Research of Concern

Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) is life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.

Federal regulations require UC Berkeley to establish a review process of potential government-funded or -conducted DURC research at the grant approval stage. 

Potential DURC research is split within two categories:

Category 1

  • Agents

    • HHS and USDA Select Agents and Toxins. Note: an attenuated strain of a select biological agent or toxin may be excluded from this list. Please see a list of excluded strains from the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP).

      • Abrin

      • Bacillus cereus Biovar anthracis

      • Botulinum neurotoxins

      • Clostridium botulinum and neurotoxin-producing species of Clostridia

      • Conotoxins (Short, paralytic alpha conotoxins containing the following amino acid sequence X1CCX2PACGX3X4X5X6CX7)

      • Coxiella burnetii

      • Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus

      • Diacetoxyscirpenol

      • Eastern equine encephalitis virus

      • Ebola virus

      • Francisella tularensis

      • Lassa fever virus

      • Lujo virus

      • Marburg virus

      • Mpox virus Clade I

      • 1918-1919 H1N1 including reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of the coding regions of all eight gene segments (Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus)

      • Ricin

      • Rickettsia prowazekii

      • Severe acute respiratory coronavirus (SARS-CoV)

      • SARS-CoV/SARS-CoV-2 chimeric viruses resulting from any deliberate manipulation of SARS-CoV-2 to incorporate nucleic acids coding for SARS-CoV virulence factors

      • Saxitoxin

      • Chapare virus

      • Guanarito virus

      • Junín virus

      • Machupo virus

      • Sabía virus

      • Staphylococcal enterotoxins (subtypes A, B, C, D, E)

      • T-2 toxin

      • Tetrodotoxin

      • Tick-borne encephalitis complex virus: Far Eastern subtype

      • Tick-borne encephalitis complex virus: Siberian subtype

      • Kyasanur Forest disease virus

      • Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus

      • Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)

      • Variola minor virus (Alastrim)

      • Yersinia pestis

    • Overlap Select Agents and Toxins

      • Bacillus anthracis

      • Bacillus anthracis Pasteur strain

      • Brucella abortus

      • Brucella melitensis

      • Brucella suis

      • Burkholderia mallei

      • Burkholderia pseudomallei

      • Hendra virus

      • Nipah virus

      • Rift Valley fever virus

      • Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus 

    • USDA Veterinary Services (VS) Select Agents and Toxins

      • African horse sickness virus

      • African swine fever virus

      • Avian influenza virus [this is included here as a veterinary select agent in 9 CFR 121.3. Low pathogenicity strains are excluded.]

      • Classical swine fever virus

      • Foot-and-mouth disease virus

      • Goat pox virus

      • Lumpy skin disease virus

      • Mycoplasma capricolum

      • Mycoplasma mycoides

      • Newcastle disease virus

      • Peste des petits ruminants virus

      • Rinderpest virus

      • Sheep pox virus

      • Swine vesicular disease virus

    • USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) Select Agents and Toxins

      • Coniothyrium glycines

      • Peronosclerospora philippinensis (Peronosclerospora sacchari)

      • Ralstonia solanacearum

      • Rathayibacter toxicus

      • Sclerophthora rayssiae

      • Synchytrium endobioticum

      • Xanthomonas oryzae

    • Other Risk Group 4 Pathogens

      • Tick-borne encephalitis virus complex including Absetterov, Central European encephalitis, Hanzalova, Hypr, and Kumlinge

      • Herpesvirus simiae (herpes B or monkey B virus)

      • Hemorrhagic fever agents and viruses as yet undefined

    • Other Risk Group 3 Pathogens

      • Bartonella

      • Brucella

      • Orientia tsutsugamushi

      • Pasteurella multocida type B -"buffalo" and other virulent strains

      • Rickettsia akari, R. australis, R. canada, R. conorii, R. rickettsii, R, siberica, R. typhi (R.

      • mooseri)

      • Chikungunya virus except the vaccine strain 181/25

      • Semliki Forest virus

      • St. Louis encephalitis virus

      • Flexal virus

      • Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCM) (neurotropic strains)

      • Hantaviruses, including Hantaan virus

      • Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)

      • Severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)

      • Japanese encephalitis virus except strain SA 14-14-2

      • West Nile virus

  • Experimental outcomes

    • Increase transmissibility of a pathogen within or between host species;

    • Increase the virulence of a pathogen or convey virulence to a non-pathogen;

    • Increase the toxicity of a known toxin or produce a novel toxin;

    • Increase the stability of a pathogen or toxin in the environment, or increase the ability to disseminate a pathogen or toxin;

    • Alter the host range or tropism of a pathogen or toxin;

    • Decrease the ability for a human or veterinary pathogen or toxin to be detected using standard diagnostic or analytical methods;

    • Increase resistance of a pathogen or toxin to clinical and/or veterinary prophylactic or therapeutic interventions;21

    • Alter a human or veterinary pathogen or toxin to disrupt the effectiveness of preexisting immunity, via immunization or natural infection, against the pathogen or toxin; or

    • Enhance the susceptibility of a host population to a pathogen or toxin.

Category 2

  • Agents

    • Any pathogen that can be modified in a way that is reasonably anticipated to result in a pathogen with pandemic potential

  • Experimental outcomes

    • Enhance transmissibility of the pathogen in humans;

    • Enhance the virulence of the pathogen in humans;

    • Enhance the immune evasion of the pathogen in humans such as by modifying the pathogen to disrupt the effectiveness of pre-existing immunity via immunization or natural infection; or

    • Generate, use, reconstitute, or transfer an eradicated or extinct PPP, or a previously identified PEPP.

This web page will be updated as more resources become available.

Resources

Related Topics

Biological Safety topic page