Lesson Learned: Aerosol Exposure in BSL2 Lab Caused by Centrifuge Failure

February 26, 2026

What happened?

Last November, a researcher in a BSL2 lab was centrifuging stocks of a Risk Group 2 biological agent when the centrifuge experienced a catastrophic failure. The researcher heard a loud pop in the middle of the cycle and went to open the lid. The researcher determined the aerosol tight rotor bucket had cracked and carried it to the tissue culture room across the lab, not realizing the conical tubes inside were also broken. Since the biological agent spilled has an aerosol transmissible route of exposure, personnel present in the lab during the incident were advised to seek assistance from Occupational Health.

What went right?

The lab quickly called the EH&S (Environment, Health, and Safety) urgent response line to report the spill and request assistance. Personnel evacuated the lab while clean up was in progress. The cleanup was performed with appropriate PPE (personal protective equipment) and disinfectants that were approved for inactivation of the biological material. The centrifuge, floors, and work stations affected were disinfected. The lab worked closely with EH&S to identify the root cause of the incident.

What should have been done differently?

The lab determined that they had used centrifuge parts from an older model that were not rated for the speed of their new centrifuge. Based on the severity of the failure, the researcher should have evacuated the adjacent lab spaces before opening the centrifuge to reduce the risk of exposure. The centrifuge should have been kept closed for 30 minutes to reduce risk of aerosolization. Carrying the broken material in a secondary containment would have prevented additional spills across the lab.

What corrective actions were taken?

  • Instituted new upper speed limits for their centrifuge
  • Discarded older, incompatible centrifuge equipment
  • Established new spill procedures for managing centrifuge incidents

Lesson Learned

To prevent similar issues in the future, labs should:

  • Ensure all centrifuge components are compatible and provide clear signage of the centrifuge’s max speed
  • Provide preventative maintenance to the centrifuge rotors and buckets according to manufacturer standards
  • Train personnel on how to manage centrifuge spills of hazardous materials. Spills within aerosol tight rotor buckets are low risk when cleaned within a biosafety cabinet or fume hood, while centrifuge failure on the benchtop that causes spills outside of the rotor bucket should be managed as a hazardous spill response.
2 conical tubes and one broke tube in a centrifuge